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Abstract—By few simple extensions it is possible to model rad-
ical groups, charismatic leaders and processes of radicalization
in the bounded confidence framework. In the resulting model we
get a lot of surprising (non-)monotonicities. In certain regions of
the parameter space more radicals or more ‘charismaticity’ may
lead to less radicalisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are some stylized facts about charismatic leaders,
radical groups and processes of radicalisation. Among them we
presumably find the following three: First, a radical group has
compared to ‘normal’ agents a comparatively stable in-group
consensus on an extreme opinion. Second, a charismatic leader
counts for ‘normal’ agents that are under his/her influence
much more than other ‘normal’ agents. Third, in a process of
radicalisation people tend to get less and less open-minded.
The three facts inspire an applied and modified version of
the well known bounded confidence model as introduced by
Hegselmann and Krause in [1]. The modified version is still
an extremely simple conceptual model. Under some assump-
tions the whole parameter space can be analysed. The model
shows some surprising results and mechanism that inspire new
possible explanations, new perspectives for empirical studies,
and new ideas for prevention policies.
II. BASICS OF THE BOUNDED CONFIDENCE MODEL
(BC-MODEL)
The basic assumptions of the BC-model are:
• There is a set of n individuals; i, j ∈ I .
• Time is discrete; t = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
• Each individual starts with a certain opinion, given by a
real number; xi(t0) ∈ [0, 1].
• The profile of all opinions at time t is X(t) =
x1(t), . . . , xi(t), xj(t), . . . , xn(t).
• Each individual i takes into account only ‘reasonable’
others. Reasonable are those individuals j whose opinions
are not too far away, i.e. for which |xi(t) − xj(t)| ≤ ,
where  is the confidence level that determines the size
of the confidence interval.
• The set of all others that i takes into account at time t
is:
I
(
i,X(t)
)
= {j∣∣|xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ } (1)
• The individuals update their opinions. The next period’s
opinion of individual i is the average opinion of all those
which i takes seriously:
xi(t+ 1) =
1
#
(
I
(
i,Xt)
)) ∑
j∈I
(
i,X(t)
)xj(t) (2)
III. MODIFICATIONS OF THE BC-MODEL
For the modified BC-model we now assume that there
are two groups of agents: The first group, the normals, have
opinions from the interval [0, 1], they all have a positive
normals > 0, and they update according to equation (2). The
second group, the radicals, have all the opinion R, with R
again from the unit interval, but more or less close to the upper
bound, e.g. R = 0.9. The radicals’ confidence level radicals
is constantly and homogeneously 0. Consequently, they update
according to
xradicalsi (t+ 1) = x
radicals
i (t) = R (3)
Figure 1 shows single runs with the same uniform start
distribution for 50 normal agents with an normals = 0.2.
In the left figure there are no radicals. Light grey vertical
lines between neighboring opinions indicate that their distance
is not greater than normals. In the figure in the centre a
group of 5 radicals is added. Their opinion is R = 0.9. The
black horizontal line is their trajectory. Dark grey vertical lines
indicate the chain of direct or indirect (i.e. via a chain of
others) influence of radicals on normals. In period 4 that chain
breaks. The dark grey area indicates that part of the opinion
space in which all normals, given the size of their confidence
interval, are under the direct influence of the radicals. (The
right figure will be explained below.)
Charismatic leaders can be covered by reinterpretation: We
consider a radical group with m members as one person that
counts m-times for all normal agents that have the charismatic
leader within their confidence interval. Thereby, the radicals’
group size m turns into a kind of degree of charismaticity.
Assuming that R is the same in all cases, the conceptual
model covers it all: a radical group, a charismatic leader, or
any combination of both.
To include that in a process of radicalisation normals get
less and less open-minded, requires a simple, but substantial
modification of the original BC-model: We apply the BC
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Fig. 1. 50 normals, the same start distribution of normals in all pictures,
 = 0.2, R = 0.9 . Left: no radicals. Centre: 5 radicals, no confidence
dynamics. Right: 5 radicals, with confidence dynamics.
mechanism, i.e. averaging over elements within one’s confi-
dence interval, on both, opinions and the confidence levels.
That modification has no effect, if  is the same for all agents.
However, in our context radicals have an radicals = 0, while
normals start with an normals > 0. As a consequence, the
confidence level of normals will shrink if they are directly or
indirectly influenced by radicals. Figure 1 right shows such a
dynamics for the same start distribution as in figure 1 centre.
Note that under this confidence dynamics (as we will call it in
the following) one normal less ends up at the radical position.
A bit more formally: A confidence dynamics makes the
confidence level normals an individualised and time depen-
dent normalsi (t) and the set of agents j that i takes seriously
changes from (1) to
I
(
i,X(t), i(t)
)
= {j∣∣|xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ i(t)}. (4)
Under a confidence dynamics normals, then, update according
to two equations:
xnormalsi (t+1) =
1
#
(
I
(
i,X(t), i(t)
)) ∑
j∈I
(
i,X(t),i(t)
)xj(t),
(5)
and, additionally, with regard to the confidence level by
normalsi (t+ 1) =
1
#
(
I
(
i,X(t), i(t)
)) ∑
j∈I
(
i,X(t),i(t)
) j(t).
(6)
The radicals stick to their confidence level 0 and ‘update’
accordingly:
radicalsi (t+ 1) = 
radicals
i (t) = 0. (7)
(2) together with (3) defines a system without a confidence
dynamics. (3) together with (5) to (7) is the corresponding
systems with a confidence dynamics of normals.1
1Note that in the model the radicals or a charismatic leader, respectively,
are simply given. Baurmann, Betz and Cramm present in [2] a model in which
charismatic opinion leaders can evolve.
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Fig. 2. x-axis: the confidence level increases in 50 steps of size 0.01 from
0.01 to 0.5. y-axis: the number of radicals increases from 1 to 50. Colours
indicate the number of normals that end up at the radical position which is
here assumed to be R = 0.9 . The total number of normals is always 50.
Left: without a confidence dynamics. Right: with a confidence dynamics.
IV. FIRST RESULTS
There are many interesting questions about final results, e.g.
the number or frequency of normals that finally end up at
the radical position R, the mean and median of the normals’
opinions, or – as one of several possible distance measures –
something like a root mean square deviation of the normals’
opinions with regard to R. It is very natural to think that
final results crucially depend upon the number of radicals
(or the degree of charismaticity, respectively) compared to
the number of normals, the confidence level at t = 0, and
the radical Position R. All the questions mentioned above,
can be answered by systematic simulations that cover the
whole parameter space—admittedly, under some simplifying
assumptions.
A first step in this direction is documented in figure 2.
The figures show, indicated by color, the number of normals
that finally end up at the radical position R, which in this
example is assumed to be R = 0.9 . To the left are the results
without, to the right the results with a confidence dynamics.
The x-axis gives the value of the normals’ confidence level
at t = 0. It is the same for all normals. In 50 steps of size
0.01 the confidence level normals increases from 0.01 to 0.5.
The y-axis gives the number of radicals (or the degree of
charismaticity, respectively). In 50 steps that number increases
from 1 to 50. As to the normals we always assume 50
agents with opinions all over the opinion space. For each step
combination x, y we run simulations until the dynamics is
(almost) stable. Then we count the number of normals that
(almost) ended up at the radical position R. Figure 2 shows,
indicated by colors, the number of normals that finally end up
at the radical position.
There are at least three lessons that we can take away from
figure 2:
1) With or without a confidence dynamics, for a certain
range of confidence levels an increasing number of
radicals leads to less radicalisation in the sense that less
normals end up at the radical position R. Thus, for a
certain range of confidence levels radicalisation is mildly
though clearly monotonically decreasing with respect to
the number of radicals.
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2) In another range of confidence levels, again with or
without a confidence dynamics, it holds: With only a
few radicals no normal ends up with the radical position
R. Above a certain number of radicals suddenly all
normals end up with the radical position. But if we
further increase the number of radicals, then, suddenly,
we get again less radicalisation. Thus, in that range of
confidence levels radicalisation is not monotonic with
respect to the number of radicals.
3) For any number of radicals, with a confidence dynamics
the sudden transition to a state in which all normals end
up radical occurs, compared with the dynamics without
a confidence dynamics, only for much bigger confidence
levels. In general: The confidence dynamics lets the
confidence level of at least some normals shrink. But
that leads to comparatively less radicalisation.
Obviously, in our model works a complicated and some-
times counteracting interplay of increasing number of radicals
and/or an increasing size of the confidence level. As a con-
sequence we get some counterintuitive (non-)monotonicities.
All the effects can be explained by an analysis of single runs.
V. NEXT STEPS
The simulations documented in figure 2 show, indicated by
color, the number of normals that finally end up at the radical
opinion, which was assumed to be R = 0.9. To get a complete
overview we will run simulations for R = 1.0, 0.99, . . . , 0.5.
That will be done for both, without and with a confidence
dynamics. The results will be visualised by two animations
of 51 pictures of the type used in figure 2. There is much
more that can be analysed and visualised in the same style:
for instance, the mean or the median of the normals’ opinions,
the final cluster structure and their distances to the radical
position.
However, there are two major caveats with regard to the
preliminary results: First, it has to be checked, whether or not
the results crucially depend upon the ratio or the absolute
numbers of normals and radicals. And, second, a kind of
confession: The results in figure 2 are not based on repeated
runs with random start distributions for each x, y-combination.
They are based on just one run for each combination. In all
runs the same very special, but in a certain sense ‘typical’
start distribution of n normals is used: An opinion profile
is an ordered profile iff for all i ≤ (n − 1) it holds that
xi(0) ≤ xi+1(0). In all runs of figure 2 we use an ordered
start profile in which the ith normal opinion is i/(n + 1). In
such an ordered and equidistant start profile the ith opinion
is exactly there where it will be at the average over infinitely
repeated uniform random distributions. On the one side, that
distribution is therefore very ‘typical’. On the other side, the
regular structure of the profile may make us blind for important
effects that are caused by the typical density fluctuations of
single random distributions. Whether or not the use of our start
distribution is a problem or a solution of many problems has
still to be checked.
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